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Holography, the three-dimensional imaging technology, was 
portrayed widely as a paradigm of progress during its decade of 
explosive expansion 1964–73, and during its subsequent 
consolidation for commercial and artistic uses up to the mid 1980s. 
An unusually seductive and prolific subject, holography successively 
spawned scientific insights, putative applications and new 
constituencies of practitioners and consumers. Waves of forecasts, 
associated with different sponsors and user communities, cast 
holography as a field on the verge of success—but with the 
dimensions of success repeatedly refashioned. This retargeting of the 
subject represented a degree of cynical marketeering, but was 
underpinned by implicit confidence in philosophical positivism and 
faith in technological progressivism. Each of its communities defined 
success in terms of expansion, and anticipated continual progressive 
increase. This paper discusses the contrasting definitions of progress 
in holography, and how they were fashioned in changing contexts. 
Focusing equally on reputed ‘failures’ of some aspects of the 
subject, it explores the varied attributes by which success and failure 
were linked with progress by different technical communities. This 
important case illuminates the peculiar post-World War II 
environment that melded the military, commercial and popular 
engagement with scientific and technological subjects, and the 
competing criteria by which they assessed the products of science.  
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Introduction  
Practitioners are often the principal narrators of the evolution of a 
young technical subject, and the first judges of its significance and 
potential. Within such communities of technologists and scientists, 
while the validity of technological progressivism has been eroded 
over recent decades, it has continued to inform judgments of 
success. Historians of science and technology can inadvertently 
sustain such viewpoints by omission, overlooking subjects that do 
not demonstrate commonly recognized indicators of achievement.
1 
Such criteria are usually taken to include the intellectual, cultural 
and economic impact of new sciences and technologies. Other, 
sociological, indicators may include the emergence of a disciplinary 
presence in academic curricula; a professional identity; and, the 
growth of occupations related to the new subject. Yet the absence of 
some of these characteristics excludes a wide range of subjects in 
science and technology from consideration, and indeed some 
historians and sociologists argue that such fields represent a distinct 
class.
2 
These unstable subjects resist recent sociological explanations 
of consensus. They may not, for example, show convincing closure 
of technical and intellectual debates.
3 
Further attention is needed to clarify how interest groups can 
differently assess ‘success’ and ‘failure,’ and thereby influence 
the fate of technologies and their subsequent historical 
evaluation, but a more sensitive approach than studying these two 
alternate end-points is to study attributions of progress. During 
the evolution and lifetime of a technology, outright success and 
failure are seldom judged; instead, practitioners and adopters 
evaluate progress so as to apply corrective measures, make 
decisions about adoption or revise forecasts. Only in retrospect 
does the subject acquire the totalizing label ‘success’ or ‘failure.’ 
By observing how progress is evaluated group by group and case 
by case, we can gain a clearer understanding of their effects on 
the technological trajectory and ultimate judgment of a subject, 
and how they relate to historians’ own assessments. Such 
analysis may reveal the overgeneralizations and unbalanced 
perspectives that can promote faith in technological determinism.  
A study of this kind is perhaps easiest for a young subject that 
has attracted several technical constituencies and for which 
consensus has been elusive. Such a subject is holography, the 
science of three-dimensional imaging based on optical 
interference. From its conception in 1947, the field has repeatedly 
mutated and successively enrolled new communities of 
practitioners, sponsors and consumers. While in some respects a 
typical post-World War II technical subject, holography has been 
unusually wide-ranging in the applications and social groups that 
it embraced. The subject found relatively stable niches as a 
scientific specialty and technical solution, but has attracted 
ambivalent assessments of progress. Holography has been both 
vaunted and criticized based on contrasting criteria of an 
unusually broad range of technical communities. As a result, it is 
a rich historical case for exploring attributions of progress, 
success and failure.  
How do the backgrounds of different communities, and 
changing scientific, economic and political environments, 
influence the reception of a new technology? This paper 
examines how notions of success and failure became linked with 
expansion and progress. Holography illuminates the peculiar 
post-World War II environment that melded the military, 
commercial and popular engagement with scientific and 
technological subjects, and the competing criteria by which they 
assessed their products.  
 
Origins and Forecasts  
During the first two decades of holography (1947–66) concepts 
coalesced but forecasts shifted dramatically. The nascent subject 
was shaped in three intellectual environments, and became linked 
to existing concepts, inventions and metaphors, each of which 
shaped perceptions of its prospects and defined its criteria of 
success.  
Holography began as a technology founded on a novel 
scientific insight. Dennis Gabor (1900–79), who conceived what 
he called ‘wavefront reconstruction’ while working as an 
engineer at British Thomson-Houston in Rugby, England in 
1947, described it as an invention for improving electron 
microscopy. He envisaged his two-step imaging technique as a 
method of avoiding the inherent aberrations of electron 
microscope lenses.  
The key idea relied on optical interference using 
monochromatic light. A wavefront of light falling on an object is 
perturbed by it—diffracted around opaque edges, delayed in 
being transmitted through transparent portions, or otherwise 
modified upon reflection. If the light source is coherent (that is, 
of a well-defined wavelength and having stable phase), it will 
form a pattern of fine fringes if the perturbed and unperturbed 
portions of the optical wavefront are brought together: the 
resulting dark and bright regions map destructive and 
constructive interference between the two portions. Gabor’s 
insight was that this optical interference pattern, which he dubbed 
a ‘hologram,’ could be used subsequently to reconstruct a faithful 
three-dimensional image of the original object when illuminated 
by coherent light.  
According to Gabor’s implementation, the electron beam of an 
electron microscope could be used to produce such a hologram of 
a microscopic sample. Being coherent owing to its well-defined 
energy and origin from a small aperture, the electron beam would 
be diffracted by the microscopic sample to form a ‘physical 
shadow,’ or interference pattern, on photographic film. Once 
developed, the hologram would be placed in an ‘optical 
synthetiser’ (sic) to use its diffraction pattern to reconstruct an 
enlarged and complete image, which could be corrected optically 
to overcome the limitations of the electron lenses used to record 
it.  
Based partly on the positive response to the concept from 
scientists such as Sir Lawrence Bragg, Max Born and Sir Charles 
Darwin (grandson of the evolutionist, and Director of the 
National Physical Laboratory in Britain), Gabor joined Imperial 
College, London as a senior academic in 1949, continuing 
development of what he called ‘my favourite baby’ via an 
industrial research grant with colleagues at Associated Electrical 
Industries (AEI).
4 
Nevertheless, Gabor, who by then had over 
twenty years’ experience as an inventor in areas as diverse as gas 
discharge lamps, stereoscopic cinema and speech compression, 
conceived wavefront reconstruction in narrow terms. He sought a 
patent framed in terms of apparatus for microscopy, predicting 
that the tool could be developed to reveal individual molecules.
5 
A handful of other investigators pursued Gabor’s ideas, usually 
starting from the standpoint of microscopic imaging using X-
rays, electron beams or radio waves.
6 
Given Gabor’s identification of the technique with 
microscopy, and improved optical resolution as a criterion of 
success, his technique had a restricted life. By the late 1950s he 
and his collaborators had abandoned their research owing to a 
variety of difficulties. The AEI workers, attempting to alter their 
commercial microscope to record interference fringes, blamed 
technical limitations. They found that their electron source was 
not adequately coherent,
7
 and vibration, sample heating and 
instability of the electron beam further aggravated their problems, 
but Gabor also attributed social factors to the affair, blaming 
wavering commitment from his industrial colleagues and 
conservatism of microscope manufacturers. Ascribing their 
‘failure’ to inadequate motivation, and concerned that publicity 
would sour researchers to the subject, he complained to the 
Research Director at AEI, T. E. Allibone, that he did ‘not like 
being the bright boy who produces brilliant dud ideas’.
8 
Nevertheless, Gabor and his student W. P. Goss experienced 
their own technical difficulties in developing the optical 
synthetizer stage of the apparatus. The principal problem was a 
‘conjugate,’ or undesired twin, image reconstructed from the 
hologram. This fuzzy and inextricable second image overlapped 
the desired reconstruction, rendering the technique unsatisfactory 
for practical use. Gabor struggled to devise optical methods of 
subtracting the twin image to improve image quality, but found 
that his carefully fabricated optical schemes demanded extremely 
high mechanical tolerances and precise optical alignments to 
yield even mediocre results. Other workers seeking a theoretical 
solution to the twin-image problem also found themselves facing 
dead ends. By 1956, the most enthusiastic of them, Gordon 
Rogers, wrote privately, ‘As far I am concerned, I am quite happy 
to let Diffraction Microscopy die a natural death. I see relatively 
little future for it, and am looking forward to doing something 
else.’
9 
And two years later, Allibone publicly narrated the work in 
historical terms, dismissing it as an unproductive detour for his 
company that had, at least, led to further work in correcting the 
shortcomings of conventional electron microscopes.
10 
From the perspective of practicing microscopists, Gabor’s 
technique was judged to be unpromising and arcane, a conclusion 
exacerbated by his limited practical achievements in attaining his 
own research targets. Moreover, by merging electron microscopy 
with visible optics, wavefront reconstruction had aspects that 
appeared retrograde rather than progressive. For instance, instead 
of the immediacy of seeing an image on a fluorescent screen (as 
some electron microscopes then produced), the reconstructed 
image was to be obtained more painstakingly via a 30-minute 
exposure, conventional photographic processing, unintuitive 
optical transformation, and observation through a conventional 
microscope eyepiece.
11 
In their various ways, these evaluations were shaped by their 
investigators’ backgrounds and working contexts, and judged 
Gabor’s wavefront reconstruction distinctively during its shaky 
10-year run. The ‘failed’ subject nevertheless was rehabilitated 
posthumously; indeed, Gabor was to be awarded the Nobel Prize 
in Physics for holography in 1971. Unlike early accounts that 
stressed unsustainable progress, later stories could tell a tale of 
triumph over adversity; of tenacious and even heroic workers 
toiling in obscurity; of a chain of insights leading to a general 
principle and patent claims; and of the inevitable success and 
progress of science.  
This overturned judgment followed American research pursued 
quite independently of Gabor and his contemporaries. A research 
engineer at an American classified lab, Emmett Leith (b. 1927) of 
the Willow Run Laboratories (WRL) of the University of 
Michigan, had begun work in 1954 on the processing of signals 
from a new form of radar, known as synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR). He and colleagues at Willow Run had devised a means of 
using coherent light to transform the radar signals, recorded in 
the form of gray tracks on a long strip of film, into a high-
resolution optical image.  
By 1956, Leith had conceived a relationship between this 
process and the theory of physical optics. In 1960, Leith and his 
colleague in the Radar & Optics Lab, Juris Upatnieks (b. 1936), 
began to extend Gabor’s work from their distinct cognitive 
standpoint of optical information processing, a fertile hybrid of 
communication theory (familiar to the electrical engineers that 
dominated WRL) and physical optics (familiar to physicists). 
They developed a technique that sidestepped the technical 
disadvantages of the twin image problem.
12 
Impressive results 
followed from this research: first, the ability to produce clean 
reconstructed images of line drawings in early 1961;
13 
second, 
high-quality grayscale images at the end of 1962; and finally, 
with the use of the newly-available laser as a coherent light 
source in late 1963, an astonishing form of three-dimensional 
imagery in which the reconstructed images exhibited depth and 
parallax with unprecedented realism. In May 1964, Leith’s and 
Upatnieks’ three-dimensional hologram was announced and 
demonstrated at the Spring Optical Society of America meeting, 
and over the following months conference papers, newspaper 
reports and press releases portrayed it as ‘lensless three-
dimensional photography.’
14 
The accounts nevertheless strained to represent the perceived 
link with the photograph. The Leith–Upatnieks hologram was a 
kind of transparency, but the image was observed by looking 
through the hologram as through a window. Its featureless 
surface was described as storing the image for later 
reconstitution. The copy of a hologram yielded not a negative 
image, but another positive. And unlike a photograph, the 
hologram could recreate a view of the entire image from any part; 
the pieces of a broken hologram still worked. The technique was 
also restrictive: only small laboratory scenes could be recorded. 
The transmission hologram was tied to the laser as a light source, 
not just for its initial recording but also for subsequent 
reconstruction. The unfamiliar attributes of this ‘window with a 
memory’ were difficult to reconcile with concepts of 
photography but, despite the imperfect correspondence, 
photography was to be a convenient guide to understanding the 
new medium and in forecasting its future development.
15 
In parallel with these American developments but equally 
hidden in its early stages was work pursued by Yury Denisyuk 
(b. 1927) in Leningrad. Denisyuk, an optical researcher at the 
Vavilov State Optical Institute since 1954 and beginning an 
advanced degree there four years later, was investigating means 
of recording the wavefront of light reflected from an object. He 
extended ideas that had been pursued at the turn of the century by 
Gabriel Lippmann, who had conceived a technique for recording 
the interference of light through the depth of a fine photographic 
emulsion. When Lippmann’s special recordings were 
subsequently illuminated, they could reconstruct the full color of 
a scene by constructively reinforcing the component wavelengths 
that had recorded the regular layers. Denisyuk considered an 
extension of the same process using coherent light, and deduced 
that such interference layers captured not only the wavelengths 
used, but also the geometry of the wavefront of light itself. His 
‘wave photographs’ could reconstruct the image of a three-
dimensional surface, but without the necessity of a focusing lens. 
Using a mercury arc light source, as had Gabor, Leith and 
Upatnieks, Denisyuk created three-dimensional images of curved 
mirrors and simple reflective objects.
16 
The technique, 
subsequently known as ‘Denisyuk,’ ‘Lippmann’ or simply 
‘reflection’ holography, was different in concept and 
implementation from those of Gabor and Leith and Upatnieks. It 
reconstructed three-dimensional images by reflection from the 
hologram in normal (‘white’) light, and had no link with either 
microscopy or image processing. Instead, its more demanding 
recording conditions and viewing arrangements made it rather 
analogous to a 19th century daguerreotype, but with the addition 
of depth and (potentially) color.
17 
While Denisyuk initially 
struggled to conceive applications of his concept, he portrayed 
his technique as a superior form of photography for a limited 
class of objects, or as a color-dependent optical element. Because 
of this unimaginative portrayal and lack of an influential mentor, 
his Soviet contemporaries largely ignored Denisyuk’s research.  
Thus the work of Gabor, Leith–Upatnieks and Denisyuk 
created at least three versions of an intellectual concept and its 
associated technologies: either an instrument for improved 
microscopy; a type of three-dimensional, lensless photograph in 
the form of a transmissive window; or, a method of recording the 
complete optical properties of a shallow object on a reflective 
plate. These divergent conceptions, arising from different 
technical and occupational contexts, profoundly shaped the early 
forecasts of the subject known by 1966 as holography. Moreover, 
their respective ‘successes’ were differently evaluated. Gabor’s 
narrow portrayal of wavefront reconstruction during the 1950s 
had yielded few forecasts beyond improved microscopy. His 
concept was self-limiting and of interest principally to workers 
interested in ultra-microscopy and the then limited field of 
physical optics. Denisyuk’s self-assessment was similarly derided 
or ignored. By contrast, the Leith–Upatnieks conception excited 
great interest far beyond the domain of physicists and engineers. 
The intellectual locus for these initial forecasts was photography, 
and the geographical locus was the town of Ann Arbor, where the 
University of Michigan and the Willow Run Laboratories were 
based.  
The Conductron Corporation and Commercial Predictions of 
Holography  
For most American observers, the Leith–Upatnieks technique 
was framed in terms of a potential success story. Popular 
accounts portrayed the viewing of a hologram as a sublime 
experience filled with childlike wonder, as an outgrowth of 
photography, as an expression of modern science, and as an 
illustration of industrial and scientific collaboration.  
Awe was an emotion commonly voiced by viewers of 
holograms. The notion of a ‘technological sublime,’ explored by 
historian of technology David Nye, is relevant to the experience.
18 
While Nye focuses on the effects of large-scale technology in 
evoking a sense of the sublime (immense dams, complex 
railways and the atomic bomb, for example) I would argue that 
holograms and their viewing environments had a profound 
impact akin to glimpsing a rare natural phenomenon. Consider 
the rainbow appearing after a severe storm, and dividing the sky 
into bright and dark regions by its colourful arc; ice haloes 
appearing in the shrouding fog of a cold morning; bright 
lightning bolts in an otherwise inky sky; the heiligenschein, a 
halo of light surrounding the shadow of one’s head reflected from 
a field of dewy grass; or the glory, a circular rainbow around the 
shadow of an airplane as it flies above a cloud. Each of these 
optical phenomena is experienced in a peculiar context that 
isolates the observer from the everyday world.
19 
The same transcendent experience could be experienced in 
demonstrations of holograms. Like natural phenomena, the 
experience of viewing a hologram awed early observers because 
of the profoundly unfamiliar imagery and disorienting 
environment. The holographic images of the 1960s were isolated 
from the viewer, appearing behind the hologram surface, and 
were illuminated by the unnatural speckled light of the laser. 
Rooms were dark, and sometimes shrouded in curtains; the 
hologram was illuminated by a hidden source, appearing bright 
and disembodied from its environment, and most importantly, the 
image was three-dimensional, realistic and yet untouchable. Even 
when, like the first generation of holograms made by scientists, 
the images were mundane—tools, trains or chessmen—the 
context gave them an aura of ghost-like unfamiliarity.  
The viewing experience suggested hidden potential to early 
observers. Holography as a subject seemed replete with latent 
possibilities for new imaging applications, and there were veiled 
uses, too: the Willow Run Laboratories, having the largest early 
concentration of holographers, continued to focus on classified 
applications of optical data processing for its sponsors in the 
Department of Defense. One consequence of the parallel public 
and hidden lines of research was that Leith’s and Upatnieks’ 
contributions were initially eclipsed by a new colleague in the 
more academically open Electrical Engineering Department of 
the University of Michigan.
20 
Nevertheless, early commercial expansion of the technology 
went hand-in-hand with military sponsorship. The most 
significant early explorations of holography’s commercial 
potential were made at the Conductron Corporation in Ann 
Arbor. The company had been founded in 1960 by Keeve M. 
(Kip) Siegel, an engineer-entrepreneur who had joined the 
Willow Run Labs in 1948 and heading its Upper Atmospheric 
Physics Group between 1949 and 1953.
21 
Siegel, a larger-than-life 
figure who directed the laboratory authoritatively but 
charismatically, populated his new Conductron Corporation with 
employees drawn from WRL and supported initially, like Willow 
Run itself, by military  
22 
contracts. 
The Conductron Corporation took up holography by the same 
route that Leith had been drawn to it—via synthetic aperture 
radar (SAR), and using surplus resources from lucrative 
development contracts. One of their first contracts, directed by 
physicist Gary Cochran, was to produce optical processing 
equipment for SAR data processing. By late 1964, he had made 
his first hologram, and later recalled:  
Kip Siegel had a chance to see it, and he was fascinated. Kip 
Siegel was a promoter. He was the kind of guy [who felt that] it 
didn’t matter whether you made any money if he could get the 
excitement of Wall Street bankers and get more investment 
capital. He saw the potential …. Siegel was clearly interested in 
developing the technology as a tool of investment.
23 
As Cochran began to study the field, making bigger and better 
holograms, Siegel became seduced by the technology. From 
1965, he dedicated Conductron’s optical team to pursuing 
impressive and sublime applications of holography.  
Siegel proselytized a merging of military and commercial 
domains. Underlying it was strong faith correlating the 
advancement of knowledge with inevitable technological impact. 
Conductron’s growing variety of display pieces was intended to 
illustrate inexorable progress: in effect, the company attempted to 
suggest determinism by boot-strapping commercial interest, 
attracting investment financing to further develop technical 
improvements. By early 1967, Cochran’s 40-strong optics group 
was responsible both for SAR contracts for the military and for 
hologram production and development aimed at would-be 
corporate sponsors.  
They worked initially to advance the technical possibilities of 
display holograms, moving from 4×5 inch to 8×10 inch and then 
11×14 inch ‘window’ holograms during 1966. Holograms, lit by 
filtered mercury lamps, were increasingly produced for trade 
show displays. More dramatic but less practical holograms were 
shown only to visitors in the Conductron lobby or lab. For 
instance, when a helium-neon (red) and argon (blue and green) 
lasers were combined to make separate holographic exposures on 
the same hologram plate, they could create a color image. While 
such holograms attracted interest and exemplified the technical 
progress being made in image reproduction, their display 
requirements (two carefully aligned and power-hungry lasers) 
made them too unwieldy to be sold or even displayed outside the 
lab. The notion of progress was thus problematic from the outset: 
displays became more impressive, but the necessary equipment 
multiplied in cost, complexity and unreliability.  
Progress was also touted in terms of production range and 
capacity. Between 1965 and 1970, the firm created over a 
thousand custom holograms for clients ranging from Hoffman La 
Roche (pharmaceutical displays for trade shows) to General 
Motors (lobby, museum and trade show displays) to artists 
(Richard Wilt and Bruce Nauman). Conductron’s most important 
customer proved to be the publishers of the World Book 
Encyclopedia, who contracted the company to produce 
holograms to be included in the forthcoming 1967 Science Year. 
The project required the copying a ‘master’ hologram of chess 
pieces to make some 500,000 copies on film. The resulting 
copies, bound into the books, could be illuminated by a flashlight 
directed through a supplied red plastic filter.
24 
This unprecedented 
achievement nevertheless provided ambivalent commercial 
success: production costs were covered, and the publication 
proved the best-selling edition of the Science Year, but no orders 
of comparable size followed.
25 
Beyond such status-raising achievements, Siegel directed 
Conductron’s staff to develop dramatic demonstration pieces to 
support his predictions for holography. What had been identified 
as an autonomous technology became ever more intentional and 
stage-managed. A consummate showman, Siegel’s unrestrained 
forecasts had a strong effect on public expectations. A typical 
example of Siegel’s rhetoric was the claim that, by 1975, ‘the 
United States will have, as far as new products are concerned, 
only three-dimensional television and three-dimensional movies 
on the market. I would not expect two-dimensional processing, 
two-dimensional television, two-dimensional home movies to 
continue—that’s my personal belief. I don’t think people will buy 
things that are antiquated.’
26 
One of Siegel’s most public predictions was the inevitable 
development of holography as a medium for recording large-
scale events, epitomized by his goal of making a holographic 
movie of the Olympic games. When his new McDonnell Douglas 
partners remained skeptical of the feasibility of holographic 
movies, Siegel’s engineers devised a holographic animation to 
demonstrate the feasibility of such applications. Using a loop of 
70-mm wide film, they recorded several dozen individual 
hologram frames of a model merry-go-around, repositioned 
manually for each individual holographic exposure. For 
reconstruction, the engineers adapted a commercial projector to 
illuminate the frames successively in a continuous loop. The 
result was an animated (and cyclic) 3D movie. The reconstructed 
scene was viewed through magnifying optics to give a realistic 
perception of a three-dimensional changing scene.  
Despite their severe technical constraints, the short animations 
were portrayed as a commercially important step towards 
holographic movies and television. This approach of producing a 
proof-of-concept model was an extension of methods pursued in 
military research contracts. Siegel’s company sought to continue 
this feedback cycle (attracting more investment capital for ever-
more impressive demonstrations) to the point of yielding viable 
commercial products. Such activities also encouraged optimistic 
research for solutions to unlikely goals, in a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. For example, while the rather limited demonstration 
device illustrated the principle, Conductron engineers realized 
that producing practical holographic movies would require a 
high-powered pulsed laser to record moving objects—such as 
people—before they could move enough to smear the 
interference fringes on the photosensitive plate, and that such a 
laser for recording outdoor scenes would certainly have 
dangerous and probably unattainable power requirements.
27 
Nevertheless, during 1966 and 1967, they developed a pulsed 
ruby laser that produced a sufficiently intense beam to record first 
a human hand, and soon a human portrait in a darkened room.
28 
When further technical improvement proved impossible, the 
Conductron marketing staff sought to redefine the goals. They 
turned from holographic movies to three-dimensional human 
scenes, recording holograms of commercial displays, groups of 
poker players and (perhaps apocryphally) nude dancers.
29 
Siegel’s impossibly optimistic predictions and speculative 
funding sustained the momentum at Conductron until 1967, when 
he resigned to form a new start-up firm, KMS Industries. The 
design of dramatic demonstrations and the pursuit of paying 
customers for holograms continued at both Conductron and KMS 
Industries for a further three years. When McDonnell Douglas 
moved the Conductron operation to Missouri in 1970, it even 
more intensively marketed the commercial possibilities of pulsed 
holography for advertising purposes.
30 
At his new company on the 
other side of Ann Arbor, Siegel created a new holography team to 
pursue viable applications and further enticements for investors.  
The ‘success’ of the Conductron development was thus 
ambivalent. The pulsed-laser activities were company- and 
investor-funded and commercially unproductive, but illustrated 
clear technical progress in a limited domain over a short period. 
Through such developments, the company became the messenger 
of a particular view of progress. For Conductron, the hologram 
was an effective icon, embodying all that was new and valued in 
that well-funded decade, and melding the laser, high science and 
awe-inspiring imagery into an example of seemingly inevitable 
technical advance.
31 
This divergence between marketplace reality 
and commercial claims is not unique, of course: it was a feature 
in other new technological fields such as nuclear power during 
the 1950s, biotechnology from the 1980s and nanotechnology 
from the 1990s.
32 
Even the vocabulary associated with such 
developments can unconsciously suggest that improvement is 
somehow inherent, via phrases such as ‘emerging technology’ or 
‘promises outpacing achievements’.  
In a more restrained fashion, other firms, too, cited practical 
indicators of progress for the new science. From the late 1960s, 
for instance, ‘holographic interferometry’ or ‘holographic non-
destructive testing’ (HNDT), a sensitive technique for measuring 
mechanical motion or deformation, became popular with 
metrologists and mechanical engineers and found a market niche. 
A commercial holographic tire-tester developed by the Ann 
Arbor company GC-Optronics, for example, allowed the 
lamination of airplane tires to be verified rapidly. For this 
application, the criteria of success were economic (lower costs) 
technical (better testing reliability) and social (improved 
customer safety).  
Nevertheless, these criteria were not often attained. By 1970, 
Clark Charnetski, a physicist at Conductron, could summarize 
what the company had already learned in its own attempts to 
promote holography. He noted that the spectacular predictions 
made by Siegel and others had provided large investment capital 
but few commercially viable applications. To the surprise of 
Conductron engineers, display holography had been less 
important economically than had other uses such as holographic 
non-destructive testing. Charnetski ascribed this to the cost and 
difficulty of producing holograms of large scenes and in 
developing copying processes. But the problem also had non-
technical dimensions:  
Holography was and still is largely done by scientists and 
engineers, and these people are as a whole more interested in the 
scientific things and therefore lend their talents more readily to 
scientific applications than toward breaking into the advertising 
game.
33 
The often-vain exploration for potential markets led a number of 
large firms to withdraw quietly from the field by the early 1970s. 
For instance, CBS Laboratories employed Dennis Gabor as a 
consultant but developed no promising products. RCA developed 
a prototype consumer video playback system (Selectavision 
Holotape) in 1969, but canceled the project in 1972 when the 
firm was in financial difficulties and facing competition from 
more versatile magnetic recording technologies. McDonnell 
Douglas closed its pulsed holography operation in 1973 owing to 
inadequate interest from the advertising industry and corporate 
customers. IBM’s early enthusiasm for holographic computer 
memories did not culminate in products, and Polaroid 
Corporation, while developing recording techniques and new 
photosensitive media during the 1970s, did not effectively market 
them.  
The enthusiasms of technologists did not necessarily translate 
to those of wider culture. Marketing holograms proved 
unexpectedly difficult, and there was increasing disjunction 
between technical forecasts and economic reality.  
Sponsorship and Community Values  
The Conductron experience illustrates how one community—a 
nascent commercial group operating according to practices 
absorbed from military-contract research— defined holography 
and its accomplishments during the 1960s. Its engineers were 
habituated to exploring applications creatively in a classified 
context and with relatively abundant funding, and were imbued 
with confidence in the very notion of progress. They arguably 
were less sensitive to commercial pressures than were typical 
workers in industry, however, because they envisaged 
holography as a dramatic and inevitable extension of 
photography. Conductron consequently sought display 
applications that highlighted its three-dimensionality and visual 
impact. Less convincingly, its engineers forecast and pursued the 
extension of holography to color imagery, movies and television 
based on the technical trajectory of those earlier imaging media, 
and most misleadingly, again using the analogy of early 
photography, they predicted a rising public appeal and inevitably 
growing market just like its antecedents.
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Ann Arbor, while generating the first cohort of holographic 
researchers, had an atypical context of research and funding. 
Other academic scientists and commercial engineers, less 
dependent on military sponsorship, operated in different 
intellectual, funding and social environments. Moreover, by 1970 
a wider range of adopters was becoming involved in the subject, 
particularly artisans and artists inspired by the counterculture and 
technological art, respectively.
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 Each of these embryonic 
communities developed a unique perspective on the nature of the 
subject, its goals and criteria of success.  
As discussed above, for military sponsors and the scientific 
holographers who pursued research for them, the demonstration 
of theoretical extensions and technological potential were 
paramount. Military supremacy required a competitive edge, and 
sponsors favored bold replacements of existing technologies. The 
result created an expectation of continual extension of knowledge 
and technical capabilities, and a continuance of the relative 
freedom from economic concerns that had dominated military 
research since World War II. There was a consequent faith in 
both positivism (particularly in its view of knowledge as 
incrementally and inexorably growing) and technological 
progressivism (inevitable improvement in performance measured 
according to self-evident technical criteria), with both assuming 
social improvement as a foreseeable by-product.  
For artists, on the other hand, success in holography was 
evaluated according to different criteria. The medium had to have 
adequate technical versatility to support aesthetic expression, and 
the new art form required the acceptance of art critics and a 
receptive public. While this was relatively free of positivist 
underpinnings, these criteria did embody implicitly progressive 
ideas, namely the assumption that the capabilities and audience 
for the medium would expand.  
Different criteria applied to artisans who took up holography 
during the early 1970s. Their definition of progress was a 
combination of growing audiences and income from the sale of 
holograms, alongside the development of new techniques of 
production, especially cost-effective or simplified methods. But, 
as with other communities of holographers, success was defined 
in terms of expansion, which amounted to anticipation of 
continual progressive increase. These practitioners supported 
their work by operating schools of holography in non-academic 
and non-scientific contexts, through custom work for clients, and 
by the sale of holograms to the public.  
It is noteworthy that the community of artisans, like aesthetic 
or fine-art holographers, often supported this implicit assumption 
of technical progress and consequent mass popularity even while 
embracing countercultural themes. Thus for all three 
communities—scientists, artists and artisans—stagnant 
conditions, measured in terms of income generation, technical 
abilities, and acceptance by critics, consumers, students or the 
wider public, equated to failure for the subject.
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During the 1980s, despite its exposure to hundreds of 
thousands of viewers through public exhibitions of holograms, 
and the growing ubiquity of mass-produced holograms, the 
subject could not be characterized reliably by these criteria, and 
appeared different to each constituency. The indefinable state of 
progress can be illustrated by bibliometric indicators: by the mid 
1990s, while the annual publication rates of papers and patents 
were rising, those of books and theses were falling, and the 
number of scientific conferences and hologram art exhibitions 
had diminished to half their value of a decade earlier.
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For artists 
and artisans, the field was declining; for scientists, it had periodic 
ups and downs; but for inventors and investors, it continued to 
look promising. Economic, rather than population, indicators 
consequently became a widely accepted mark of success of the 
medium. For different communities then, holography was a 
subject that either evinced obvious success, remained latent with 
potential, or had outlived its promise.  
Segregating Communities: Judgments of Successful Imagery  
The contrasting judgment of separate constituencies is further 
illustrated by the goals of holographic imaging. The emerging 
occupational specialists of holography variously identified the 
strengths and weaknesses of holographic technology. They 
argued that a collection of limitations surrounding the hologram 
prevented the expansion of the technology of holography in 
wider culture. This was a two-way process: their mutually 
incompatible criteria encouraged the holographic communities to 
differentiate further. The divergence of holograms and their 
associated communities is consistent with the framework of 
social construction of technology (SCOT) and its concepts of 
relevant social groups and interpretative flexibility.
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However, 
for most of these groups consensus and closure were not attained. 
Instead, their technical goals diverged while they continued to 
seek improvement for their medium, making stability elusive.  
The gaze of these distinct communities identified dissimilar 
limitations for the medium. The first to be noted were problems 
with the laser itself.
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Holograms illuminated by lasers revealed 
the phenomenon of laser speckle. The reconstructed image and, 
indeed, any surface illuminated by the laser, appears to shimmer 
and sparkle with a graininess that depends critically on the 
position of the observer’s eyes. The effect, resulting from the 
random constructive and destructive interference from the highly 
coherent laser light (having a narrow distribution of wavelengths 
and light waves that were ‘in step,’ producing interference over 
centimeters or even meters), was exacerbated by diffusely 
reflecting surfaces. This technical artifact could mask the 
otherwise stunning imagery of the hologram, but was a complaint 
of scientists and engineers more than aesthetic holographers: 
laser speckle was a particular problem when photographing 
holograms, an activity common in scientific and engineering 
studies, but relatively unimportant for casual viewers.
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On the other hand, the cost of the laser was a crucial constraint 
for artists and advertisers but of relatively little importance to 
well-funded scientists. Continuous Wave (CW) lasers remained 
prohibitively expensive for galleries to purchase in moderate 
numbers, and pulsed lasers were out of reach of most 
laboratories. Lasers were also unfamiliar and intimidating for 
non-scientists, and their use was curtailed severely with the 
introduction of safety legislation in the early 1970s concerning 
eye exposure to laser beams, but lasers were also relatively dim 
light sources for reconstructing the holographic image. Seldom 
exceeding tens of milliwatts of optical power, the laser was 
adequate to illuminate a single hologram well in a normally lit 
room, but not in a daylight-illuminated shop window. If any other 
form of light were used to reconstruct a hologram, the image 
would be unacceptably blurred. Neither of these restrictions was 
a particular problem for scientific applications such as 
holographic interferometry, but judged to be a severe limitation 
for public displays.  
A third characteristic constrained holography as a medium for 
portraits. The very monochromaticity of laser light provided 
eerily unworldly images akin to the street illumination from 
sodium lamps, or the orthochromatic (blue- or green-sensitive) 
images of early photographic and cinematographic films. The 
contrast and tonal gradations of reconstructed images appeared 
unfamiliar, and was inferior to the panchromatic black-and-white 
films that had been used universally since World War II.  
This effect was exacerbated in the first portraits made with 
pulsed ruby lasers. Because human skin is slightly transparent to 
the wavelength of a ruby laser, portraits made subjects look 
waxy-skinned, blotchy and disturbingly morbid. Unlike 
photography, its perceived analog, holography failed to develop a 
market for portraiture, and artists who adopted pulsed lasers more 
successfully employed them for figure studies rather than facial 
depictions. For photographers, holographic portraiture and color 
holography represented problems, not progress.  
A further constraint was that holographic images were static, 
and thus of limited interest for media applications. Indeed, the 
imagery of living things represented an instant of time, frozen in 
space. Holograms produced with pulsed lasers, acting like a fast 
flash camera, captured unsettlingly frozen facial expressions of 
their subjects who had been sitting in near darkness, often 
accentuating the unfamiliarity by showing the unusually wide 
irises of the dark-adapted eye.
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In sum, these limitations restricted holography to a narrow 
class of subjects and to a seemingly unnatural or stylized 
representation, paradoxically in opposition to its highly realistic 
perspective. The ‘problems’ and putative ‘solutions’ were 
differently ranked for different communities, however.  
The most pressing problem for aesthetic and commercial users 
(but irrelevant for scientists) was the need for a laser to display 
the hologram. Denisyuk’s holograms of the early 1960s offered a 
solution: they produced a clear green image when viewed in 
sunlight or room lighting. But creating such holograms demanded 
extremely high-resolution photographic emulsions and very 
stable conditions during the exposure. They became popular in 
the Soviet Union from the mid 1970s as a means of recording 
historic objects, but had a low uptake in the West because the 
emulsions and chemistry were not readily available, and because 
artists perceived them to offer limited options for creativity.  
Another technical approach was the ‘image plane’ hologram, 
in which a hologram of a hologram (a ‘second generation’ 
hologram) was recorded.
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Such a hologram produced little color 
smearing of reconstructed images for points near the plate, so a 
white light source was adequate to view holograms of shallow 
objects. A secondary advantage was that such images were even 
more striking than conventional holograms: the image appeared 
to pass through the hologram plate. This appealing attribute 
became ubiquitous in commercial and art holograms by the late 
1970s, but was of little interest to scientists.  
During the early 1970s, the ‘rainbow hologram’ also became 
widespread. The technique, later dubbed ‘white light 
transmission holography’, was reported tangentially by Polaroid 
scientist Stephen Benton (1941–2003) in 1969 while his 
employers sought a patent, but became more widely known only 
from 1973 after his collaboration with artist Harriet Casdin-Silver 
(b. 1925).
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By employing a special optical geometry to record the 
hologram, a sharp image could be viewed in white light, although 
cast in a spectrum of colors that shifted with the viewing 
position. Benton became a well-known intermediary between 
scientific and artistic communities, particularly after his move to 
the new MIT Media Lab in 1984. The Media Lab, uniting a 
collection of enthusiastic engineers and scientists, sought to 
transform culture via new media technologies, aiming, as one 
breathless account put it, to invent the future.
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Benton’s Spatial 
Imaging Group was funded by sponsors courted by Conductron 
20 years earlier: General Motors and the American military, via 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).  
Rainbow holograms importantly reduced the cost of displaying 
holograms, but had an uneven popularity that further divided 
supporters. East-coast American holographers, close to Benton’s 
Massachusetts laboratory, adopted rainbow holograms more 
enthusiastically than did their west coast and European 
counterparts. Artists championed the technique, discovering that, 
by overlaying several exposures, a single hologram could display 
multi-colored images. However, rainbow holography was 
rejected by Soviet practitioners, who saw the technique as 
complex and much poorer in quality than their own reflection 
holograms, and by most American scientists, who were 
concerned with the accurate recording and dimensional analysis 
of three-dimensional objects or transitory events.
45 
By allowing white-light reconstruction of the holographic 
images, these techniques removed the need for an expensive laser 
for viewing, and also removed the objectionable speckle that 
went with it. They were also bright (especially for rainbows), 
although usually limited in depth. Bleaching the photographic 
emulsion allowed holographic images to be even brighter, aiding 
the art community and the most promising market niche of the 
1970s, advertising.  
From the 1980s, ‘embossed holograms’ provided new 
opportunities for technical judgments and forecasts. Embossed 
holograms combined image-plane and rainbow holography in a 
reflective form that could be reproduced using adapted printing-
press technology. Manufactured by the millions on metal foil, 
they became ubiquitous in packaging, graphic arts and security 
applications.
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While this brought holograms to a much wider 
audience, it generated dramatically divergent judgments. Unlike 
the previous varieties of holograms, this new type generated not 
just indifference from different communities, but outright 
animosity.  
Embossed holograms were inexpensive, reducing the cost of 
copies by a hundredfold. They could be mass-produced reliably 
using a number of proprietary techniques that seemed less 
constricted by patents than were earlier products. They were 
chemically and mechanically stable, unlike most previous 
hologram materials that were susceptible to scratches, humidity 
or aging. Together, these technical advantages promoted the 
widespread application of embossed holograms.  
However, connoisseurs of imaging—the self-styled ‘display 
holographers’ made up of artists and artisans—derided embossed 
holograms. The flexible backing of embossed holograms, 
particularly those on magazine covers, caused color shifts and 
image distortion, and because the holograms were usually viewed 
in uncontrolled lighting, images could appear fuzzy or dim. In 
response to these limitations, their producers progressively 
simplified the imagery to incorporate shallow, eye-catching 
patterns, a product that some in the industry contemptuously 
dubbed ‘shiny shit.’
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By moving toward less ambitious images, embossed 
holograms evolved to minimize their perceived weaknesses and 
to exploit new markets. While applications such as magazine 
illustrations declined, others expanded, and created new 
industries and adopters. Visual appeal was redefined. Their image 
characteristics made embossed holograms particularly suitable 
for attention-grabbing product packaging (a profitable and 
growing industry from the early 1990s) and for security 
applications, where any defect in the complex pattern could 
indicate tampering or counterfeiting.
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This technical mutation, while capturing a large market and the 
first undeniably profitable application of holography, arguably 
amounted to a reversal of the original aims of the medium. Yet 
consensus about success could not be defined in utilitarian terms. 
Embossed holograms promoted low-cost mass production but 
had relatively poor image quality; they brought three-dimensional 
imagery to vastly increased audiences, but simultaneously 
reduced the sublime characteristics of depth, parallax and image 
clarity. Security applications exploited the complex color shifts 
and angle-dependence of embossed holograms, making the 
forgery of credit cards and bank notes more difficult, but for 
imaging purposes, these characteristics were deemed to be a 
serious defect. Fine-art holograms became less popular, with 
artists complaining that embossed holograms irreparably 
devalued the aesthetic attraction of the medium.
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This expansion 
of holography into the mass market was thus judged by its initial 
supporters to be a failure, because it had deviated from their 
forecast trajectory. The ‘shiny shit’ had defiled the utopian 
predictions.  
The evolving techniques for producing bright, white-light 
holograms thus both liberated the growing field of display 
holography in the 1970s for commercial use and constrained its 
acceptance in the 1980s, particularly for artists. The tribulations 
of display holographers were not faced by most scientific and 
engineering users, who continued to employ laser-viewable 
holograms; nor were they recognized by marketers of packaging 
and anti-counterfeiting holograms. Thus, the applications of 
holograms supported the growing segregation of practitioners and 
conflicting definitions of success.  
Wider Judgments: Critics and Consumers  
Gabor’s wavefront reconstruction, Conductron’s exploration of 
commercial markets, and the ambivalent assessments of display 
holography illustrate the varied judgments attached to the subject. 
For all communities of holographic practitioners, however, 
expectations of progress remained strong. Indeed, some forecasts, 
oft rejuvenated, seemed impervious to attributions of failure 
despite the continued lack of demonstrable viability. Among 
these were predictions of holographic ‘optical memories’ for 
retrieving data.
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One reason for the endurance of such promised 
applications was faith in technological progressivism and 
determinism by its advocates, even when uncorroborated by 
evidence. It was expected that the new invention would not only 
provide new and better things, but would necessarily change 
culture and wider society as a result.  
Nevertheless, holography was repeatedly cited as having failed 
in expanding enthusiasm, garnering audiences and developing 
markets—a failure, in effect, to conform to the expectations of 
technological progressivism. Artists responded with dismay, for 
instance, to negative reviews of a large hologram exhibition, 
Holography ’75, held at the International Center for Photography 
in New York, which curtailed their expectations of aesthetic 
acceptance and growing markets.
51 
Both critics and artists (to their 
chagrin) portrayed holography as immature and in a state of early 
aesthetic and technical development; both, indeed, were imbued 
with a similar definition of progress.  
In order to sustain continued confidence, predictions mutated. 
Forecasts during holography’s first active decade—extending 
from 1965 to 1974—had been uniformly expansionist, making 
unrealistically optimistic extrapolations based on laboratory 
demonstrations or even speculative applications.
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Some 
commentators had attributed deviations from commercial 
forecasts to the complexity of patent litigation, and the resulting 
hesitancy of many firms to employ holograms as a result.
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When, 
after one decade, two decades or a quarter century, material 
achievements were not obvious to all, the original commentators 
and others—notably Stephen Benton, who became prominent as 
conference organiser and holography pundit—recast the 
development of their field as an historical narrative either still 
linked with latent progress
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or portrayed simplistically as a 
classic tale of market failure.
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Yet none of these later depictions dominated public 
consciousness of holography. Instead, understandings became 
shaped by fictional portrayals, causing a bifurcation between the 
technical realities and the imagined future of the medium. These 
positivistic depictions of progress in fictional holography 
originated from the scientific and commercial forecasts of the 
1960s but dramatically extended and diverged from them. For the 
general public, the notion of holograms as awesome but 
intangible images was fostered by the film Star Wars (written 
1973–7, released 1977), and on television by the British comedy 
series Red Dwarf (pilot written in 1983, series broadcast 1988–
94) and the Star Trek television series The Next Generation 
(broadcast 1987–94) with its ‘holodeck,’ or holographic 
visualization room, by Deep Space Nine (1993–99) with 
‘holosuites,’ or commercially-operated holographic 
environments, and by Voyager (1995–2001) with its ‘Emergency 
Medical Hologram,’ or virtual doctor. These science fictional 
portrayals transformed the hologram from a glass plate into a 
more dramatic creation, ranging from mere optical playback of a 
recording (in Star Wars) to computer-generated lifelike 
characters (in Red Dwarf) to entire interactive environments that 
include sensations of touch, sound and smell (in the later Star 
Trek series).
56 
Popular culture thus became diverted by a virtual 
image of the subject that could not be realized by any community 
of holographers.
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Anticipation, supported by faith in progress, 
threatened to outstrip reality.  
This splitting of real and imagined futures, evident in the 
earlier commercial forecasts as well as later science fictional 
accounts, is a theme common to many new technologies. It has 
parallels with the account that Colin Milburn has given of 
nanotechnology, for instance. Milburn argues that popular and 
professional writing about nanotechnology amounts to a 
‘teleological narrative’ that transforms a dream into something 
that is inevitable.
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He suggests that promotion of the subject has 
transgressed a line between ‘speculative science’ (an 
extrapolation of current scientific thinking, describing what could 
be) and ‘fictional science’ (an account of what, inevitably, will 
be, in some world to come). In a similar vein, Kip Siegel’s 
forecasts could be characterized as fictional science that 
influenced science fiction writers a decade later. Such incredible 
extrapolations may not require the disorienting qualities of the 
hologram, though. The near-utopian predictions for holography, 
promoted by its fantastic early commercial claims, have been 
made of other, more mundane, technologies.
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In any case, such fictional diversions increased expectations, 
and adversely affected the cottage industries of holography that 
appeared during the 1980s. Small firms selling holograms for 
home viewing, which had sprung up in major cities after major 
exhibitions, failed to thrive. Small commercial galleries, such as 
the Holos Gallery in San Francisco, gradually discovered that 
sales of holograms could sustain them only if their businesses 
were transformed into wholesaling operations for distributing 
holographic trinkets to museums of science and technology.
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Popular interest and markets proved fickle, however, and few 
companies became profitable for long. The sale of holographic 
art, always marginal, declined as holographic kitsch in the form 
of embossed foils for children’s stickers and magazine covers 
began to flood the market from the mid 1980s. As discussed 
above, it is significant that artisanal and artistic holographers 
identified this trajectory as non-progressive and hence an 
indicator of failure. They commonly characterized the altered 
focus of public interest as a descent similar to the history of 
earlier three-dimensional media, transforming them from a 
sublime technological experience to mere children’s products 
having lower intrinsic value.
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Thus they judged the type of 
audience to be more important than its size.  
The limited public acceptance of commercial holograms meant 
that real-world holographers continued to struggle for 
occupational status and acceptance of their products. The subject, 
its communities and their aspirations of progress were closely 
interlinked. The technical groups associated with holography 
proved unstable partly because public engagement and 
employment were themselves uncertain. Holography did not 
develop applications that generated a stable occupation supported 
by university-taught courses.
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The growth of long-lived 
occupations and accredited teaching programs, usually deemed 
crucial for the consolidation of a new profession and a new 
discipline, could not be sustained by the applications of 
holography. Instead, the subject spawned several marginal 
constituencies, along with distinct forecasts and criteria of 
success. Even the best supported of these, the broad field of 
optical engineering and scientific holography, found its military 
and corporate funding difficult to sustain after the Cold War. 
Artists and artisans found their exhibitions and income reduced 
by the expansion of embossed holograms and changing public 
expectations. Colleagues in other fields consequently interpreted 
the relative social invisibility of holographers as a failure of the 
subject.  
During the late 1980s, when holography was at a peak of 
visibility, practicing display holographers comprised an active 
community of about a thousand individuals ranging from 
scientists, to artisans, artists and entrepreneurs. The New York 
Museum of Holography kept files on some 280 individual 
holographers, and attracted some 50,000 visitors to view their 
products every year.
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Yet the Museum, founded in 1976 to serve 
not just the disparate subcultures of holography but also the 
general public, discovered that holographers’ sense of community 
was ephemeral and inward looking. As discovered by the schools 
and cottage industry that appeared during the 1970s and early 
1980s, the Museum found that the general public absorbed the 
ideas and enthusiasms of holographers with difficulty. In 
response, these budding organizations mounted education 
campaigns that sapped more traditional profit-making activities. 
These oft-repeated initiatives appear to have had only a local and 
transient impact. While the early 1970s had witnessed sustained 
growth in the constituencies of holography, signs of decline in 
institutional support of display holography became noticeable 
during the 1990s.
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Conclusions: Evaluating Progress, Success and Failure  
As the cognitive boundaries of a technical subject shift, so, too, 
do its applications and users, and their criteria of success. 
Examples abound in holography of how ‘failures’ and 
‘successes’ were interpreted inconsistently by shifting audiences. 
The various advocates of holography had distinctive aspirations, 
employed contrasting criteria to evaluate its goals, problems and 
solutions, and thereby buttressed their own differentiation. Thus 
Gabor’s wavefront reconstruction was typecast as a technically 
constrained, and even backward-looking, microscopy during the 
1950s, unworthy of forecasts. During the 1960s, the revitalized 
subject was widely understood in terms of photography, an 
analogy that directed predictions in ways that were difficult to 
sustain. Scientists, artists and artisans portrayed their subject as 
potential-filled, and judged it by its expansion, especially by the 
number of adopters. They had divergent definitions of good 
imagery, however, and so judged progress in conflicting ways. 
Was the technique developing toward metrological accuracy in a 
laboratory environment, colorful displays in shop windows, 
aesthetically nuanced fine art, the recording of public events, or a 
ubiquitous anti-forgery product? Given the multiple 
constituencies, no consensus was possible, nor can any generally 
agreed attribution of progress be made. For the same reason, we 
cannot judge straightforward technological failure here. There 
was, however, a failure of technological forecasting, owing to 
over-confidence in short-term achievements made in an over-
inflated funding environment.  
Judging progress, success and failure is further complicated by 
the altering prominence of these marginal technical communities. 
Embossed holography could be represented as an unalloyed 
success in the late 1990s not only because of its commercial 
profitability, but also because there were then fewer holographic 
artists to criticize its imaging characteristics than two decades 
earlier. Holography as a concept and technique was discordantly 
categorized by its users, successively rejected, resurrected and 
relegated to vulnerable commercial niches.  
The history of the assessments and forecasts of holography has 
implications for other studies in the history of science and 
technology. As this case shows, historical evaluations of progress 
can be critically sensitive to appraisals made by different 
communities, particularly for unstable technologies that are 
adopted by distinct social groups. Each of them—such as 
scientists, the military, artists, businesspeople and the public— 
may employ different criteria in judging the subject. While we 
may expect attributions of progress to depend on established or 
enunciated criteria, the case of holography shows that judgments 
may be based almost entirely on implicit assumptions and 
superficial analyses.
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Expectations for the trajectory of holography were supported 
by faith in both philosophical positivism and technological 
progressivism and fueled by the expansive funding environment 
of 1960s America. The predictions of progress relied on little-
examined assumptions and short-term forecasting, and its 
monitoring flavored subsequent judgments of success and failure, 
but reexamination of such assessments is difficult for such 
insecure subjects: lack of market success or professionalization 
can hinder the documentation of a field. Would-be fields like 
holography must be tracked by the historian as they evolve, not 
from scanty archival records. There will be a tendency to under-
represent subjects that have not been judged progressive and 
successful by its contemporary practitioners and critics.  
Holography further illustrates how closure is not an inevitable 
outcome for debates in scientific subjects that do not reach 
disciplinary status, or for technologies that do not achieve 
commercial viability. It suggests caution surrounding uncritical 
assumptions about the evolution of technological subjects: the 
inconsistent assessments of progress and success cannot be 
attributed merely to the youth of a subject or to inchoate relevant 
social groups. The notion of the ‘maturity’ of a subject is 
problematic and must be divorced from scholars’ own 
expectations of progress towards consensus.  
Not all technologies become black-boxed; some merely lose their 
supporters and are forgotten.  
Gabor, the originator of the hologram, wrote and lectured on 
science and society in his later years. One of his books, Inventing 
the Future, argued that while technological societies find 
themselves unable to predict the future, they can invent it for 
themselves.
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This aim, echoed by the engineers at Conductron 
and the MIT Media Lab, was not reached, but in altered form, the 
claim can be applied to predictions about the subject that Gabor 
initiated: the imagined future for holography has been recast 
repeatedly by successive waves of holographers, and continues to 
be reinvented by its subsequent practitioner communities and 
adopters. The complementary perspective—namely explaining 
the past course of the subject—is equally a matter of reinvention 
that must be disentangled from implicit assumptions about 
progress and success. In a subject riven by contrasting 
assessments and predictions, I have argued that the only 
indisputable failures surrounding holography concerned the 
forecasts themselves.  
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Notes  
[1] By contrast, perceptive analyses of ‘failure’ include, for example, 
Shinn, ‘Failure or Success?;’ Elzen, ‘The Failure of a Successful 
Artifact;’ Kunkle, ‘Technology in the Seamless Web;’ Gooday, ‘Re-
writing the “Book of Blots”;’ McCray, ‘What Makes a Failure?’  
[2] See, for example, Joerges and Shinn, Instrumentation for 
contributions on these subjects denoted ‘research-technologies’. On 
the negotiation of professional identity, see Abbott, The System of 
Professions.  
[3] On the social factors in the closure of debates surrounding 
technological options, see Pinch and Bijker, ‘The Social 
Construction.’ My discussion of holography follows excellent studies 
of the early history of technologies, such as Bijker’s study of the 
bicycle (ibid.), and Susan Douglas’s account of radio (Douglas, 
Inventing American Broadcasting). However, it differs from such 
cases in dealing with a technology that has not achieved a consensual 
evaluation by any user group for more than a brief period.  
[4] Dennis Gabor to M. E. Haine, letter, 18 June 1949.  
[5] British patent 685,286 ‘Improvements in and Relating to 
Microscopy’, filed 17 December 1947 and published 31 December 
1952. Gabor never sought a patent for wavefront reconstruction itself. 
For his most detailed presentation of the concept, see Gabor, 
‘Microscopy by Reconstructed Wavefronts.’  
[6] These included Gordon L. Rogers, a former student of William Bragg 
in England; Paul Kirkpatrick and his students Albert V. Baez and 
Hussein M. A. El-Sum in California; and Adolf W. Lohmann in 
Germany.  
[7] That is, the electron-beam source did not have an adequately narrow 
range of wavelengths and a localized spatial origin to form many 
interference fringes. The typical coherent optical source of the period 
was a mercury arc lamp shining through an optical filter and small 
aperture. This generated interference fringes between two beams for 
optical path differences of a fraction of a millimeter.  
[8] Dennis Gabor to T. E. Allibone, letter, 22 March 1954; Dennis Gabor 
to Sunday Times, letter, 14 April 1968.  
[9] Gordon L. Rogers to A. V. Baez, letter, 19 July 1956.  
[10] Allibone, ‘White and Black Elephants.’  
[11] For a more extensive discussion of Gabor’s work and its early 
reception, see Johnston, ‘From White Elephant to Nobel Prize.’  
[12] Their principal experimental innovations were the use of ‘off-axis’ 
beams, which amounted to imposing a carrier frequency on the 
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research, see Forman, ‘Inventing the Maser’ and Seidel, ‘From Glow 
to Flow.’  
[32] See, for example, del Sesto, ‘Wasn’t the Future.’  
[33] Charnetski, ‘The Impact of Holography.’  
[34] The introduction of the stereoscope during the 1850s mirrored aspects 
of the introduction of holography over a century later. Stereoscopic 
images were as awe-inspiring and shocking as holograms were, 
provoking ‘at once wonder, exuberance, hesitation and confusion’ 
[Green, ‘“Pasteboard Masks”,’ quotation p. 109]. In both Europe and 
America, analysts wrote often-contradictory explanations of the 
nature, possibilities and power of the new photographic process, 
which mutated rapidly from a scientific curiosity to a commercial 
phenomenon.  
[35] Johnston, ‘Shifting Perspectives.’  
[36] A related constituency was the amateur enthusiast. This was 
promoted by popular articles in Scientific American, via its ‘Amateur 
Scientist’ section, which described scientific construction and 
experimental projects, and by a handful of articles in journals for 
physics educators. These appealed to lone experimenters who 
modelled their activities on a scaled-down version of professional 
scientific practice and research. As hobbyists rather than goal-
directed career workers, amateur holographers tended towards an 
optimistic and uncritical view of technological progress. See, for 
example, Heumann and Stong, ‘The Amateur Scientist;’ Webb, 
‘Holography for the Sophomore Laboratory;’ Dickson and Stong, 
‘The Amateur Scientist;’ Walker, ‘Amateur Scientist: Easy Way;’ 
Walker, ‘Amateur Scientist: Rainbow;’ Walker, ‘Amateur Scientist: 
How to Stop.’  
[37] Johnston, ‘Reconstructing the History.’  
[38] Pinch and Bijker, ‘The Social Construction.’  
[39] Leith and Upatnieks, trying lasers for the first time in December 
1962, found them a nuisance because of the optical ‘noise’ from stray 
reflection and interference, and only after several months did they 
abandon mercury lamps [Hecht, ‘Applications Pioneer Interview;’ 
Juris Upatnieks, 12 January 2005].  
[40] Speckle is most noticeable from a fixed position and using a small 
camera aperture to photograph an image having a large depth of field. 
For observers bobbing their heads to see the parallax of the image, 
though, the speckle is smeared out.  
[41] For a survey, see Bjelkhagen, ‘Holographic Portraits.’  
[42] Rosen, ‘Hologram of the Aerial Image.’  
[43] Benton, ‘Hologram Reconstructions.’  
[44] Brand, The Media Lab.  
[45] Yu. N. Denisyuk, 3 May 2003. Rainbow holograms also are devoid of 
vertical parallax: when moving up and down, the observer sees the 
same image in a different color rather than a different perspective.  
[46] McGrew, ‘Mass Produced Holograms.’ See, for example, the 
National Geographic Magazine covers of March 1984, November 
1985 and December 1988. Key aspects of embossing technology had 
been developed for RCA Selectavision Holotape in the early 1970s.  
[47] The economics of embossed holograms did not improve the 
professional situation of holographers: embossing processes were 
taken over by commercial printing companies using fairly 
conventional equipment, and relied on holographers only for the 
production of the original master hologram.  
[48] Credit card holograms were introduced by MasterCard in 1983. The 
hologram industry was subsequently dominated by packaging and 
security applications, a domain represented by a periodical 
(Holography News, published by Reconnaissance International from 
1987), by annual conferences (Holopack-Holoprint, from 1989) and a 
trade body (International Hologram Manufacturers’ Organization, 
1992) seeking to monitor and regulate an industry growing most 
rapidly in the Far East.  
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the mid 1980s and early 1990s.  
[63] MIT Museum, MoH archive series 3, boxes 26–31.  
[64] The New York Museum of Holography closed in 1992, and its 
holdings were auctioned and transferred to the MIT Museum a year 
later; the Museum für Holographie und neue visuelle Medien in 
Pulheim, Germany, founded in late 1979, closed in 1994, as did Le 
Musée de l’Holographie in Paris, founded in 1980; The Holography 
Unit of the Royal College of Art, an important source of postgraduate 
fine-art holographers, closed in 1994; the Canada Council ceased 
funding for holography in 1995; and, the final Gordon Research 
Conference of scientist-holographers, initiated in 1972, was held in 
1997.  
[65] Another example is the case of the New National Telescope, which 
astronomers widely judged a failure because it was never built 
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